Men and Chickens: Should We Be Moral Nihilists?

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Human sense of morality is related to many factors, among which "disgust" is a relatively unique emotional response. From an evolutionary perspective, the emergence of disgust allows us to stay away from certain diseases (you can imagine your first reaction when you see patients with smallpox, syphilis, etc.), while also ensuring that we are not excluded from relatively mainstream groups in social culture.

The hypothetical case at the beginning of the article is of course a bit extreme, but it has indeed happened in reality (at least you have heard about it from the news and rumors), and I believe many people's first reaction is disgust and disgust. Now, suppose this man has sex with another man, will your disgust be reduced? Suppose this man has sex with an artificial intelligence robot, how will your moral sense react?

In my opinion, moral silence happens from time to time, but so-called right and wrong are also fluid - we can see this in people's attitudes towards homosexuality and sex robots today (even if they don't understand, they can tolerate it). In other words, our disgust is also constructed in a sense, but the question is, can the inherent diversity of human morality be reconciled with the bottom line?

A man went to the supermarket once a week to buy a chicken. But before cooking the chicken, he had sex with it, cooked it and ate it.

No one except you knew about this bizarre behavior. No one was harmed by this man's unusual behavior with the dead chicken. Do you think this man was morally wrong?

Jonathan Haidt (1963-). © New Statesman In his book The Righteous Mind, moral psychologist Jonathan Haidt seeks to find the basis of human morality. He wants to convince us that morality is a broad and rich concept.

Haidt begins the book by giving readers a thought experiment that leads us to consider how emotions and intuitions underlie moral reasoning. In the next two chapters, Haidt explains what he calls the principles of moral psychology:

1. Intuition comes first, followed by strategic reasoning;

2. Morality is not just about harm and fairness.

Through several social experiments, Haidt and his colleagues have shown that most of our moral judgments are based on our immediate emotional reactions to events.

Most of us would be immediately disgusted by the weirdo man having sex with a dead chicken. Haidt argues that we will find ways to rationalize our disgust at the behavior (usually by looking for reasons that cause harm). He calls this "post-hoc reconstruction."

Haidt's first principle is designed to challenge the entrenched intellectual tradition of "rationalism." The traditional view is that morality and questions of right and wrong can be resolved through rigorous reasoning and argument. Haidt seeks to emphasize the role of emotion and intuition in moral philosophy.

If that weren’t enough, Haidt goes on to articulate his second principle: morality is not simply a matter of harm or fairness.

Indeed, anyone who has studied Western moral philosophy will have noticed that people take questions of harm and fairness very seriously. In fact, the first few ethical theories we introduce into moral philosophy are utilitarianism (which is primarily about harm) and deontology (which is primarily about fairness).

Some people may be surprised when Haidt boldly claims that morality is more than just these two concepts. He proposes at least four foundations for our “moral senses.” He argues that we have moral emotions (e.g., disgust, revulsion, desire) for these topics, similar to harm and fairness.

The four additional foundations/themes he introduces are "loyalty," "authority," "holiness," and "freedom." These additional themes add to our moral complexity, and they explain why some moral judgments are so difficult to accept. Importantly, these themes help explain why it is so difficult for us to rationalize our moral judgments.

For example, our foundation of holiness explains why we are instantly disgusted by the man who has sex with a chicken. But because we lack an adequate moral system to rationalize our disgust at such behavior, we find ourselves, in Haidt’s words, in a state of moral aphonia.

Indeed, it is much easier to find reasons to explain why it is morally wrong to beat a chicken with a stick than to explain why it is also morally wrong to play with a dead chicken.

Moral psychology and relativism?

Perhaps Haidt’s more interesting arguments come in his subsequent chapters, where he explains why different groups have radical moral commitments.

Because morality is not just about harm and fairness, Haidt argues that everyone has varying degrees of commitment to different moral foundations. He explains that conservatives care more about "loyalty," "sanctity," and "authority" than they do about "care" and "fairness." Conservatives are more likely to condemn having sex with a dead chicken than liberals are (even though both would be disgusted by the act).

Haidt's thesis is what moral philosophers call "descriptive moral relativism." That is, it is empirically true that every society has moral disagreements.

Haidt never labels himself a relativist. At most, he calls himself a pluralist (someone who believes that values ​​are multifaceted). But for those who believe that science (or the scientific method) can teach us about morality, like Sam Harris, Richard Dawkins, and even Haidt, one cannot help but ask an important question:

Can science tell us what a person should and should not do?

Haidt admits that moral psychology can only tell us about the psychological structure of moral reasoning. Psychology can only tell us how humans perceive and conceptualize morality, but it cannot tell us what is right and wrong.

So far, moral psychology tells us why we have an innate, intuitive, immediate aversion to certain actions. It also explains how we develop moral reasoning (often by “reframing” things after the fact to rationalize our innate aversion to things). But it can’t tell us whether those actions are actually wrong.

If we take this proposition a step further, we will tend to believe in metaethical moral relativism, which is the idea that "the truth or falsity of moral judgments or their justification is not absolute or universal, but relative to the traditions, beliefs or practices of a group."

(plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-relativism/)

Indeed, in Haidt's book, he describes his own adventures to India, where he encountered a range of Indian moral codes that were alien to him. He also discovered practices that Indians find morally reprehensible but are acceptable to Americans. One of these is calling one's parents by their first names, which is usually taboo in most Asian societies.

Again, Haidt never labels himself a moral relativist or argues that moral psychology is a relative theory of morality. But it is easy to think of it that way.

If moral judgments are based largely on our intuitions, and we acquire these intuitions from society, then we can say that moral judgments are largely derived from the social values ​​we inherit.

Now, the first reaction of anyone would be: How do we know who is right and who is wrong?

Discuss possibilities

Current moral psychology lacks a coherent claim to normative ethics. It does not tell us what we should and should not do.

Haidt’s book is to be highly praised for teaching us about the inherent diversity of our moral makeup. He explains why we instinctively disapprove of one another, and why it is so difficult for people who disagree with one another to engage in dialogue.

Haidt encourages us to tone down our instincts and to listen compassionately to those who disagree with us. Even if he is not optimistic about achieving any kind of agreement, he still sees it as a sufficient basis for developing important and meaningful dialogue.

But for moral psychology to have a say in normative ethics, it should at least tell us about the necessary psychological developments that we should adopt.

If our moral judgments are derived from our psychology, then moral psychology can easily say which intuitions, emotions, and attitudes guide our moral judgments.

Incest has long been a motif in ancient Greek mythology. Venus and Mars, Botticelli. © The National GalleryFor example, if we have a natural aversion to incest, should this aversion properly justify our moral condemnation (if we do condemn incest), or should we view this aversion as simply an attitude (revulsion) without regard to morality?

Even with a comprehensive understanding of human psychology to date, I still doubt that science or moral psychology can tell us what is morally right and wrong. Perhaps our best bet is still to look for answers outside the realm of natural science.

By Wei Xiang

Translated by Leeway

Proofreading/Yord

Original article/theapeiron.co.uk/should-we-be-moral-nihilists-690c467b2137

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